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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After the State filed a motion for summary disposition ofRorique James Toye's amended
petition for post-conviction relief, the district court summarily dismissed all three of Mr. Toye's
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The district court determined Mr. Toye had not

shown prejudice as to the claim of pre-trial ineffective assistance of trial counsel, based in part
on its taking judicial notice of its personal recollection of the prior trial proceedings. However,
the district court took judicial notice of its personal recollection without obtaining the trial
transcripts referenced. In this appeal, Mr. Toye asserts the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed his amended petition with respect to the pre-trial claim, because the district court
improperly took judicial notice of its personal recollection of the prior trial proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In Ada County No. CR0l-17-6311, the State charged Mr. Toye with two counts oflewd
conduct with a minor child and two counts of sexual battery of a minor, and he entered a not
guilty plea.

(R., p.36.) The charges related to allegations that Mr. Toye had fathered two

children with his teenaged daughter. (See R., p.77.) Following a jury trial, the jury convicted
Mr. Toye on all four counts. (R., p.36.) The district court imposed for each count a unified
sentence of thirty years, with thirteen years fixed, with the sentences to run concurrently with
each other. (R., p.37.) Mr. Toye did not appeal from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.37.)
Mr. Toye filed, pro se, a Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.1219.) He also filed a Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel. (R., pp.2225.) The district court appointed conflict counsel to represent him. (See R., pp.29-30.)
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Mr. Toye, through counsel, then filed an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
(R., pp.35-46.) He asserted that trial counsel was ineffective "[d]uring the pre-trial phase of the
underlying criminal case," because trial counsel "failed to adequately convey and/or explain plea
agreement offers from the Government, so that Mr. Toye eventually proceeded to trial without a
defense and against his wishes, and resulted in prejudice to Mr. Toye." (R., p.37.) Mr. Toye
asserted that "trial counsel failed to adequately inform him of the repercussions of proceeding to
trial without a viable defense, such as the cost and loss of judicial resources, which contributed to
Mr. Toye proceeding to trial without a viable defense and against his wishes, and resulted in
prejudice to Mr. Toye." (R., p.38.)
Mr. Toye also asserted that trial counsel was ineffective "[d]uring the jury trial phase of
the underlying criminal case," because trial counsel "caused bias against Mr. Toye with the jury
during the jury selection process of the Petitioner's trial, by tainting the jury with questions and
comments which were biased against the Petitioner." (R., p.38.) He asserted that trial counsel
was ineffective "[ d]uring the Sentencing phase of the underlying criminal case," because trial
counsel "failed to object to improper statements made by the District Judge at the Sentencing
Hearing, which the Court relied upon in imposing a harsher sentence upon Mr. Toye.

The

District Court misstated items of factual information, to Mr. Toye's detriment." (R., p.39.)
Mr. Toye asserted that trial counsel "failed to provide the effective assistance of counsel
during the pre-trial, jury trial, and sentencing phases of the case, in that his performance fell
below objective standards of reasonableness for competent representation." (R., p.42.) He then
asserted that "he was prejudiced by proceeding to trial against his wishes, rather than pleading
guilty, accepting responsibility for his offense, and saving valuable judicial resources."
(R., p.42.) He continued: "Mr. Toye asserts that had he done so, the Court would have taken
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some mercy on him and considered a lesser sentence, rather than the thirty-year sentence he
received.

But for counsel's misdirection or lack of direction, Mr. Toye would not have

proceeded to jury trial in the first place." (R., p.42.) Mr. Toye asserted that the absence of trial
counsel's "errors during the pre-trial phase of Mr. Toye's case would have dramatically changed
the outcome of the proceedings." (R., pp.42-43.) Further, Mr. Toye asserted prejudice with
respect to the voir dire and sentencing claims. (See R., p.43.)
Mr. Toye requested that the judgment of conviction be vacated and his case remanded for
further proceedings, as well as such other and further relief as the district court deemed proper.
(R., p.44.) He did not sign the Verification of Petition. (R., p.45.) He also filed an Affidavit of

Petitioner in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which was unsigned. (R., pp.48-53.)
The State later filed a Motion for Summary Disposition of Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief. (R., pp.60-62.) The State asserted Mr. Toye did not raise a genuine issue of
fact that his attorney's performance was deficient or prejudiced him, and he waived claims not
contained in his amended petition. (R., pp.60-61.) The State requested the district court "take
judicial notice of all court hearings and transcripts submitted to the court." (R., p.61.)
The State also filed a Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition. (R., pp.6371.) The brief requested "that the State's Answer be incorporated herein." (R., p.63.) In the
brief, the State argued that Mr. Toye had not raised "a genuine fact that his attorney was
deficient or that he was prejudiced," and he did not "provide the court with admissible evidence
of any of the three claims .... " (R., p.69.) The State contended, "The Petition simply concludes
that counsel was deficient without providing admissible evidence of facts to support his
conclusion," and thus there was no way Mr. Toye "can show that counsel's tactical choices
would have changed the outcome of the trial." (R., p.69.) On the pre-trial claim, while Mr. Toye
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had asserted that he wanted to plead guilty and he proceeded to trial without a viable defense and
against his wishes, the State argued, "As stated in the State's Answer-the evidence against
[Mr.] Toye was clear and overwhelming-he had no defense." (R., pp.69-70.) The State also
argued Mr. Toye had not presented admissible evidence to support the voir dire and sentencing
claims in the amended petition. (See R., p.70.)
Moreover, in the State's Answer to Amended Petition for Post-Conviction (R., pp.72-80),
the State argued, with respect to the pre-trial claim:

"Respondent denies this constituted

deficient performance or would have changed the outcome of the trial because: First, this
allegation is not supported by any admissible evidence. To the contrary, the State has multiple
admissible documents refuting this allegation" (R., p.74). The State argued it had conveyed plea
offers to Mr. Toye's trial counsel, but Mr. Toye decided to go to trial. (See R., pp.74, 81-84.)
The State further argued that Mr. Toye did not plead guilty, because he believed he had done
nothing wrong. (See R., pp.74-77.) That argument was based on the presentence report and
other materials prepared after the jury trial. (See R., pp.74-77, 85-102.) The State also argued it
had held all the evidence in the underlying criminal case, including DNA evidence linking
Mr. Toye to the offenses. (See R., p.77.)
Mr. Toye subsequently filed a signed Affidavit of Petitioner in Support of Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.105-113.) On the pre-trial claim, Mr. Toye averred that he did
not wish to proceed to a jury trial in his case, but trial counsel "either failed to communicate plea
bargain offers to me, or took so little time doing so that I have minimal recollection of any such
communications." (R., p.107.) He asserted, "I do not recall hearing any actual firm plea offers
or receiving any written settlement offers from the State." (R., p.107.)
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Further, Mr. Toye averred that trial counsel "did not take the time to assist me with the
plea bargaining process, explain the process to me, explain the consequences of proceeding to
trial without a viable defense, or provide guidance on how to proceed, other than to jury trial."
(R., p.107.) He asserted: "I eventually became so overwhelmed and disheartened that I 'gave up'
and lost hope in his defense. My case then proceeded to jury trial, despite my lack of a viable
defense, and I was convicted." (R., p.107.) Mr. Toye later learned "that proceeding to trial
without a viable defense would be considered a waste of judicial time and resources, and could
weigh against me during sentence," but trial counsel never discussed that with him. (R., p.107.)
Mr. Toye also filed a Petitioner's Verification for Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief, with a signed Verification of Petition related to the amended petition. (R., pp.114-16.)
He subsequently filed a Reply to State's Motion for Summary Disposition of Amended Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief

(R., pp.117-29.)

The reply asserted that Mr. Toye's amended

"petition and supporting affidavit were (eventually) sworn and verified, and therefore constitute
admissible evidence to support his claims." (R., p.123.)
Regarding the pre-trial claim, Mr. Toye asserted in the reply that he had provided
evidence to support the claim "in the form of his sworn declarations contained in his sworn
amended petition and supporting affidavit." (R., p.125.) This evidence "demonstrated that his
counsel failed to properly advise him, in a fashion that would have lessened the prejudice against
him in the case result," thus providing a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(R., p.125.) Mr. Toye also asserted his evidence supported a prima facie case of ineffective
assistance counsel as to his other two claims. (See R., pp.126-28.) He therefore requested that
the district court deny the State's motion for summary disposition. (See R., p.128.) Mr. Toye
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attached copies of the transcripts of trial counsel's voir dire and the sentencing hearing from the
underlying criminal case. (R., pp.133-63.)
At the hearing on the motion for summary disposition, the district court stated it would be
"considering the verified petition, the affidavit of the defendant, and the transcripts of
proceedings in the underlying criminal case that were ordered." (Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.1.) The
parties told the district court there were no other portions of the record that the district court had
overlooked. (See Tr., p.7, Ls.2-6.)
On the pre-trial claim, the State argued that Mr. Toye had "decided not to plead guilty."
(Tr., p.7, L.24 - p.8, L.6.) As for Mr. Toye's assertion that trial counsel failed to tell him he did
not have a viable defense, the State argued: "I don't know how much clearer it could get when
he already knew that he confessed to the crime and we had DNA. There was no viable defense
to this crime." (Tr., p.8, Ls.8-13.) Later, the State contended that Mr. Toye "was never going to
plead guilty" and "never thought he did anything wrong." (Tr., p.9, Ls.21-24.)
Mr. Toye asserted he only needed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance
of counsel to get past summary disposition. (See Tr., p.10, Ls.11-14.) He submitted that he had
provided enough evidence for a prima facie showing for all three claims. (See Tr., p.10, L.14 p.12, L.6.) When asked for clarification on what he was seeking, Mr. Toye explained he would
be entitled to a new trial if he prevailed on the pre-trial or voir dire claims, and to a new
sentencing hearing ifhe prevailed on the sentencing claim. (See Tr., p.12, L.16- p.13, L.7.)
On the pre-trial claim, the district court determined, "there is a material fact-issue of
fact as to what went on between trial counsel and the defendant." (Tr., p.13, Ls.13-16.) The
district court determined, "so far as the first prong of [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984)], there is a material fact that justifies an evidentiary hearing." (Tr., p.14, Ls.18-21.)
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However, the district court also determined, "The second prong of Strickland versus
Washington I do not believe has been made." (Tr., p.14, Ls.22-23.) Mr. Toye had the burden of
showing "that there is at least a factual issue that there would have been a different outcome."
(Tr., p.14, L.24-p.15, L.3.)
The district court determined: "In terms of the trial, the evidence at trial was
overwhelming. [The prosecutor] has accurately stated the nature of the record at trial, and, I
guess, to some extent I am taking judicial notice of that even though I didn't announce that to
begin with." (Tr., p.15, Ls.4-9.) The district court then determined, "But because I was there at
the trial, the record of the trial clearly shows, if one transcribes it, that the victim testified as to
the conduct, the defendant had admitted to the conduct, the DNA tests on the child, all of that
showed that the outcome of the trial was really never in doubt." (Tr., p.15, Ls.9-15.) The district
court had presided over Mr. Toye's trial in the underlying criminal case. (See R., p.36.)
Additionally, the district court stated it would "never hold it against someone at
sentencing the fact that they chose to go to trial and hold the State to its burden." (Tr., p.15, L.25
- p.16, L.4.) The district court thought there was no logical connection between Mr. Toye not
hearing the plea offers, and his receiving a harsher penalty because he went to trial.

(See

Tr., p.16, L.20 - p.17, L.1.) Per the district court, because it was not bound by the sentencing
recommendations of the parties, "the fact that Mr. Toye passed up the opportunity for a more
lenient recommendation at sentencing is not proof that he would have received a more lenient
sentence." (See Tr., p.17, L.2 -p.18, L.7.) The district court determined, "there just simply isn't
evidence sufficient to say that the sentence would have been more lenient had there not been a
trial." (Tr., p.18, Ls.22-25.)

7

The district court also determined the evidence was insufficient to support Mr. Toye's
voir dire and sentencing claims. (See Tr., p.19, L.4 - p.27, L.1.) Thus, the district court granted
the State's motion for summary disposition. (Tr., p.27, Ls.2-3.) Several months later, the district
court, with a new presiding judge, ordered the preparation of a transcript of the old presiding
judge's oral decision, and granted the motion for summary disposition based on the old presiding
judge's reasoning. (Order Re: Summary Disposition, Aug. 28, 2019.) 1 The district court entered
a Judgment dismissing with prejudice Mr. Toye's amended petition. (R., pp.164-65.)
Mr. Toye filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order Re: Summary
Disposition and Judgment. (R., pp.166-69.)

1

The Order Re: Summary Disposition is the subject of Mr. Toye's Motion to Augment, filed
contemporaneously with this brief
8

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Toye's amended petition with respect
to the pre-trial claim, because the district court improperly took judicial notice of its personal
recollection of the prior trial proceedings?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Toye's Amended Petition With
Respect To The Pre-Trial Claim, Because The District Court Improperly Took Judicial Notice Of
Its Personal Recollection Of The Prior Trial Proceedings

A.

Introduction
Mr. Toye asserts the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his amended

petition with respect to the pre-trial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, because the
district court improperly took judicial notice of its personal recollection of the prior trial
proceedings. The district court determined that the prosecutor "has accurately stated the nature
of the record at trial, and, I guess, to some extent I am taking judicial notice of that even though I
didn't announce that to being with." (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-9.) Based on its personal recollection of the
trial proceedings from the underlying criminal case, the district court determined, "the record of
the trial clearly showed, if one transcribes it, that the victim testified as to the conduct, the
defendant had admitted to the conduct, the DNA tests on the child, all of that showed that the
outcome of the trial was really never in doubt." (Tr., p.15, Ls.9-15.) The district court used its
personal recollection to support its determination that Mr. Toye had not shown prejudice on the
pre-trial claim. (See Tr., p.14, L.22-p.18, L.25.)
However, the district court improperly took judicial notice of its personal recollection of
the trial proceedings in the underlying criminal case, because the district court did not obtain the
transcripts of the trial proceedings referenced. Thus, the district court's summary dismissal of
Mr. Toye's amended petition should be reversed as to the pre-trial claim, and the matter should
be remanded for further proceedings.
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B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
"An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure

Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). Like any
other civil plaintiff, a petitioner for post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the factual allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief is based.
Id. However, unlike a complaint in a normal civil action, "an application for post-conviction

relief must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must state
why such supporting evidence is not included." Id. (citing LC. § 19-4903).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the UPCPA.
Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 477 (Ct. App. 2009). "Claims for ineffective assistance of

counsel are reviewed utilizing the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S.
668 (1984)]." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008). "To prevail on such a claim, the
applicant for post-conviction relief must demonstrate (1) counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, the result would have been different." Id.
"Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the
applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903
(citing LC. § 19-4906(b) & (c)).

"A material fact has some logical connection with the

consequential facts, and therefore is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented
by the parties. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted."
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).

On review of a summary disposition of a post-conviction petition, an appellate court "will
determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and
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admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903.

"A

court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the
petitioner's conclusions." Id.

"When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the

applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary
hearing." Id. Alleged facts would not entitle the applicant to relief when "(1) they are clearly
disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of
law." Id.

C.

The District Court Improperly Took Judicial Notice Oflts Personal Recollection Of The
Trial Proceedings In Mr. Toye's Underlying Criminal Case, Because The District Court
Did Not Obtain The Transcripts Of The Trial Proceedings Referenced
Mr. Toye asserts the district court improperly took judicial notice of its personal

recollection of the trial proceedings in the underlying criminal case, because the district court did
not obtain the transcripts of the trial proceedings referenced. A district court "may judicially
notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it" either "is generally known
within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction," or "can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." LR.E. 201(b)(l) & (2).
In a case where a district court had summarily dismissed a post-conviction petition after
giving notice of its intent to dismiss under LC. § 19-4906(b), the Idaho Supreme Court held,
"prior to dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief, the district court is required to obtain
that portion of the trial transcript as is necessary to a determination 'on the basis of the
application, the answer or motion, and the record,' that there are no material issues of fact and
that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief."' Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,
808 (1992) (quoting LC. § 19-4906(b)). The Matthews Court explained, "Facts may not be
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judicially noticed simply because they are within the personal recollected knowledge of the
judge, if those facts are not also generally known in the jurisdiction." Id. at 807. The Court also
indicated that facts attendant to a trial are not capable of accurate and ready determination,
absent a trial transcript. See id. at 808. Further, "Judicial notice taken of prior reported but not
transcribed testimony cannot be allowed because conclusions drawn from that source are
incapable ofbeing reviewed by an appellate court." Id.
The Matthews Court emphasized, "We do not mean to hold that full trial transcripts are
required in every case where a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. "In some
cases, no transcript will be necessary because the petitioner may be deficient on its face. In other
cases, a partial transcript may be all that is required to satisfy the statute." Id.

The Court

reversed the district court's summary disposition as to the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims where the district court had taken improper judicial notice, and remanded the claims for
further proceedings. Id. at 808-09.
Later, in a child custody case, the Idaho Supreme Court held, "A judge may take judicial
notice of personal recollection of prior proceedings to the extent that the judge recalls what
occurred." Navarro v. Yonkers, 114 Idaho 882, 887 (2007) (citing State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho
636, 643 (2003)).

Based on Matthews, the Navarro Court then reiterated, "However, the

previous hearing must be transcribed so that any alleged error in such judicial notice is subject to
appellate review." Id. (citing Matthews, 122 Idaho at 808).
Here, the district court took judicial notice of its personal recollection of the prior trial
proceedings, without obtaining transcripts of the proceedings referenced.

The district court

determined that the prosecutor "has accurately stated the nature of the record at trial, and, I
guess, to some extent I am taking judicial notice of that even though I didn't announce that to
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begin with." (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-9.) The district court determined "the outcome of the trial was
really never in doubt," based on its judicial notice of its personal recollection of the record of the
trial, showing "that the victim testified as to the conduct, the defendant had admitted to the
conduct, the DNA tests of the child." (Tr., p.15, Ls.11-15.) However, the transcripts of those
parts of the trial record are absent from the record for this post-conviction case. The district
court acknowledged that the trial transcripts referenced had not been obtained; rather, the district
court knew, "because I was there at trial," what "the record of the trial clearly showed, if one
transcribes it .... " (See Tr., p.15, Ls.9-11.)
Thus, the district court's judicial notice of its personal recollection of the prior trial
proceedings was improper. The Court in Matthews held "that prior to dismissing a petition for
post-conviction relief, the district court is required to obtain that portion of the trial transcript as
is necessary to a determination 'on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the
record,' that there are no material issues of fact and that the petition is not entitled to postconviction relief" Matthews, 122 Idaho at 808 (quoting LC. § 19-4906(b)).
A district court must similarly obtain the necessary portion of the trial transcript for
summary dismissals of post-conviction relief based on the motion of a party under LC. § 194906( c). Much like the standard for a summary disposition initiated by a district court under
subsection (b ), subsection (c) provides, "The court may grant a motion by either party for
summary disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of the fact, together with any affidavits
submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw." LC. § 19-4906(c).
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The two standards for summary disposition are essentially the same, as exemplified by
the Idaho Supreme Court in Charboneau observing, "Summary disposition of a petition for postconviction relief is appropriate if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material
fact." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903 (citing LC. § 19-4906(b) & (c)). Thus, in light of the
standards for summary disposition and following the logic of Matthews, prior to dismissing a
petition for post-conviction relief based on a party's motion for summary disposition, the district
court is required to obtain that portion of the trial transcript as is necessary to a determination
"from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of
the fact, together with any affidavits submitted," that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Matthews, 122 Idaho at 808;
I.C. § 19-4906(c).
The district court here therefore improperly took judicial notice of its personal
recollection of the trial proceedings in the underlying criminal case, because the district court did
not obtain the transcripts of the trial proceedings referenced. See Navarro, 114 Idaho at 887;
Matthews, 122 Idaho at 808. The district court's judicial notice of its personal recollection does
not rise to the level of what the district court must consider when addressing the motion for
summary disposition, namely the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions of agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted." See LC.§ 19-4906(c).
The Matthews Court rejected a similar notion that such judicial notice of trial proceedings was at
"the equivalent level of a court record" for purposes of subsection (b ). See Matthews, 122 Idaho
at 807. Also, as the Matthews Court held, the judicial notice taken by the district court here, "of
prior reported but not transcribed testimony cannot be allowed because conclusions drawn from
that source are incapable ofbeing reviewed by an appellate court." Matthews, 122 Idaho at 808.
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In sum, the district court improperly took judicial notice of its personal recollection of the
trial proceedings in the underlying criminal case, because the district court did not obtain the
transcripts of the trial proceedings referenced. See Navarro, 114 Idaho at 887; Matthews, 122
Idaho at 808. Thus, the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Toye's amended
petition with respect to the pre-trial claim. See Matthews, 122 Idaho at 808. The district court's
summary dismissal of Mr. Toye's amended petition should be reversed as to the pre-trial claim,
and the matter should be remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 808-09.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Toye respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district
court's summary dismissal of his amended petition as to the pre-trial claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and the remand the matter for further proceedings.
DATED this 13 th day of December, 2019.

Isl Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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